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ABSTRACT
Behavioral biometrics, such as keystroke dynamics, are characterized by relatively large variation in the input samples as compared to physiological biometrics such
as fingerprints and iris. Recent advances in machine learning have resulted in behaviorbased pattern learning methods that obviate the effects of variation by mapping the
variable behavior patterns to a unique identity with high accuracy. However, it has
also exposed the learning systems to attacks that use updating mechanisms in learning
by injecting imposter samples to deliberately drift the data to impostors’ patterns.
Using the principles of adversarial drift, we develop a class of poisoning attacks, named
Frog-Boiling attacks. The update samples are crafted with slow changes and random
perturbations so that they can bypass the classifiers detection. Taking the case of
keystroke dynamics which includes motoric and neurological learning, we demonstrate
the success of our attack mechanism. We also present a detection mechanism for the
frog-boiling attack that uses correlation between successive training samples to detect
spurious input patterns. To measure the effect of adversarial drift in frog-boiling
attack and the effectiveness of the proposed defense mechanism, we use traditional
error rates such as FAR, FRR, and EER and the metric in terms of shifts in biometric
menagerie.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Overview
Motivated by the abundance of sensors built into computing devices these days,
there is now a wide range of research studies fronting behavioral biometrics modalities
that leverage data generated by these sensors. This family of behavioral biometric
modalities includes modalities such as gait [4] and touch dynamics [16] on smartphones
and desktop-centric modalities such as keystroke dynamics [26] and mouse dynamics
[3]. Different from physical biometric modalities such as fingerprints [22], face [10],
and iris recognition [13], behavioral biometric patterns tend to be unstable [39] [28]
as users generally exhibit significant variance in their patterns. While many of these
biometric modalities have been shown to produce low error rates during authentication
experiments conducted in controlled settings, it is not well understood how or whether
the known instability of the associated behavioral biometrics patterns would impact
the performance of a real authentication system in the wild.
For example, several studies have showcased error rates of less than 5% for
behavioral biometric modalities such as touch dynamics [16], keystroke dynamics [6]
and gait [20], to mention but a few. However, the majority of these studies were based
on experiments in which data was collected from a group of users who interacted with
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the system over a period of a few days. From these studies, it is hence not possible to
determine how variations in users behavioral biometric patterns over time (say over
several months) would impact the overall system performance. Recent efforts to thwart
the potential negative impacts of these variations have showcased template update
mechanisms that correct these template variations to prevent them from negatively
impacting the classification engine (e.g., see [18]). However, these studies still suffer
from the same problem of studying behavioral biometrics using small datasets collected
over a short period, and mostly focus on showcasing the benefits of the template
update schemes without providing any systematic insights into the template variations
that the update mechanisms aim to fix.
Moreover, a noteworthy issue facing these template update schemes is that
they have the potential to be used as a vehicle of attacks on the system i.e., along
with the template update data, an adversary could insert bad data that is tuned to
systematically add noise to a user’s template. This problem has to some extent been
studied in more established biometric modalities such as face and fingerprints [37][32],
however, in behavioral biometrics, it is not known how or whether a template update
scheme could be leveraged by an adversary to compromise the system. In comparison
to physical biometrics such as fingerprints, behavioral biometrics exhibit much more
variance, which implies that past findings on template update-related challenges seen
with physical biometric modalities would not be directly applicable to a behavioral
biometric setting. To protect a biometric authentication system from “adversarial
drifting” type of attacks, several recent studies proposed defensive mechanisms [18, 19]
to reject fake updates. However, these mechanisms also have limitations, in terms that
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the updating performance is compromised, since many of the samples from genuine
users are rejected from updating.
This dissertation takes steps to tackle several of the problems discussed above.
In particular, we take the case of keystroke dynamics and examine the problem of
feature evolution in behavioral biometric authentication. We explore the impact of
feature evolution on authentication error rates and conduct a systematic evaluation
of the mechanism of feature evolution over time. Armed with our findings on the
nature of users feature variations, we evaluate the performance of various template
update schemes and address the question of how an adversary could take advantage of
the template update scheme to systematically drift a user’s template. Specifically we
tackle this last question through the design of a new attack called a Frog-boiling attack
[38]. This attack is named after the tale of the boiling frog i.e., a frog which was
unaware that it was being boiled because the water temperature had been increased in
very tiny steps (see [17]). Our attack takes the same approach as the adversary aims
to drift the template using very small updates that are too small to be detected, yet
cumulatively able to cause a significant impact on the system over time. To prevent
the attack, we propose a residual-based defense mechanism to detect and reject fake
updates to a biometric system, without sacrificing and losing too many updates from
the genuine users To support our investigations, we use two large datasets, one of
which collected over a period of three years at Louisiana Tech University (see dataset
in [35]), and the other collected over two days at Carnegie Mellon University (see
[26]). The latter dataset contains data from 138 users while the former contains data
from 51 users. Both datasets were collected while users typed a fixed text. Usage of
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two datasets collected in different settings enables us to get deeper insights into the
dynamics of template evolution.

1.2 Behavioral Biometrics
Biometrics is the technical term refers to measurements or metrics related to
human characteristics. Technologies which use these measurements to verify human
individuals are generally categorized under the term biometric authentication. Biometric authentication can be based on physical attributes of humans (e.g., fingerprints,
face, iris patterns) or on the behavioral patterns of a human (e.g., walking patterns,
typing patterns, mouse movement patterns). In both cases, a biometric system works
by comparing a user’s data samples with a template stored in advance. Depending on
the score obtained during the comparison, a user may be rejected or accepted by the
system. Where a genuine user is rejected by the system, such an event is referred to
as a false rejection (or false negative) and would typically be caused by a user seeing
variations in the biometric pattern relative to the stored template. Where an impostor
gets accepted by the system, such an event is referred to as a false acceptance (or
false positive), and occurs when the impostor has a biometric pattern similar to that
of the genuine user. In general, behavioral biometrics see much more incidences of
false acceptances and false rejections relative to physical biometrics. Despite their
much higher susceptibility to recognition errors, behavioral biometrics retain certain
advantages over physical biometrics that continue to attract a significant amount of
research attention to them.
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For example, physical biometrics require the user to perform a particular task
(e.g., hold the finger against a fingerprint reader, face the camera for a photograph to
be take, etc.). This requirement is acceptable where users have to authenticate once
before accessing a resource (e.g., when logging into a network). However, where users
have to be authenticated continuously, the requirement to have the user switch from
the task at hand to perform the dedicated authentication task is quite intrusive. As
an illustration of a situation where continuous authentication might be needed, take
the case of an individual accessing confidential data on a computer (e.g., installations
such as those in the Department of Defense). In order to determine that the individual
accessing the computer is the legitimate user, a password is typically entered at the
start of the session. However, shortly after entering the password, there is no way in
which the system can determine that the user accessing the resource is still the one
who provided the valid password. A naive solution to this problem would, for instance,
require the user to enter the password every few minutes. For many applications,
however, such an approach is bound to be rejected by users since it would perpetually
distract the user away from the main task on the computer.
Behavioral biometrics offer a natural solution to such a problem since they
are based on activities that the user is supposed to undertake anyway. For example,
a keystroke authentication mechanism only requires the user to go about his or her
routine tasks while the authentication mechanism extracts features from the typing
samples. In other words, the user can be continuously authenticated without even
having to be aware of, or pay attention to, the underlying authentication mechanism.
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Other behavioral biometric modalities such as gait, mouse movements, and swiping
patterns follow the same philosophy.
Another scenario where behavioral biometrics have interesting characteristics
is that of password hardening ([31]). This scenario is most commonly studied in the
breath of typing-based behavioral biometrics and basically entails the combination of
a password and the typing pattern into a hardened password ([31]) that is verified
at login-time. When the user types the password, the system only authenticates the
user when the password, and the method of typing the password match those of the
genuine user. This idea of password hardening can be extrapolated to other emerging
behavioral authentication modalities such as brain activity-based authentication ([12]).
Overall, these cited scenarios (i.e., continuous authentication and password hardening)
illustrate why behavioral biometrics continue to be very widely studied despite being
more susceptible to errors than the more established physical biometric modalities.
The challenges of behavioral biometrics authentication discussed in Section
1.1 apply to all the behavioral biometric modalities mentioned here and more. This
dissertation is, however, focused only on keystroke dynamics so as to enable a thorough
investigation while at the same time minimizing duplications (as would be the case
if similar analysis is repeated for multiple modalities). In the following section we
present an overview of keystroke dynamics.

1.3 Keystroke Dynamics
Keystroke dynamics (KD) a biometric modality in which keyboard typing
patterns are used to authenticate users is categorized into fixed text verification, and
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continuous text verification. In the latter category, a user’s keystrokes are monitored
continuously, or periodically during an entire typing session (typically after the login
phase), while the former category, which is also the focus of this dissertation, is based
on a fixed pre-determined text such as a password entered at login time. Verification
algorithms designed for both KD branches generally draw from the same pool of
features, of which the most commonly used are the key hold time (KHT), key interval
time (KIT) and the keypress time (KPT) [25][35]. KHT is the time between press
and release of the same key, KIT is the time between release of a key and press of
the next key, and KPT is the time between press of a key and press of the next key,
which equivalents to the sum of KHT of the first key and KIT of the two keys. Notice
that KIT could be zero or a negative value since users may press a key on or before
the previous key is released.

KEY
Kpress

Krelease

Epress

Ypress

Erelease Yrelease

t
t1

t2

t3

t4

t5

t6

Figure 1.1: Illustrating how keystroke features are computed from an arbitrary types
string. The example used here is the string KEY.

Figure 1.1 gives an example of how keystroke features are extracted when the
word KEY is typed on the keyboard. A key-logger captures the time of occurrence of
keypress and key release events, and keystroke features are calculated accordingly. For
example, with the character K pressed at time t1 and released at time t2 , the KHT of
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key K is calculated as t2 − t1 . If the next key E is pressed at t3 , the KIT and KPT
of the digraph KE are t3 − t2 and t3 − t1 , respectively. Notice that since key E was
released after the keypress of the next key Y, the KIT of digraph EY is a negative (i.e.
t4 − t5 ).

Figure 1.2: Overview of keystroke verification system on fixed text. In the training
phase, keystroke features are extracted and a template (which is a matrix of order ab
) is created for each user from a features collected during b typing attempts. In the
verification phase, features extracted from a keystroke sample is compared with the
template to produce a verification decision.

Figure 1.2 illustrates the process of a typical keystroke verification system with
fixed text keystrokes. In the training phase, each user is asked to type keystrokes for
enrollment, and a template is created. In the verification phase, the system compares
a user’s keystroke typing against the template from this user, calculates a verification
score, and gives a verification decision based on a set threshold. In this dissertation,
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we formalize a keystroke template as an ab matrix created from features collected
during b typing attempts, and each row represents a feature vector (i.e. KHTs, KITs,
and KPTs) extracted from a typing attempt.

1.4 Dissertation Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are summarized below:
1. We analyze the variability of users keystroke biometric patterns (i.e., template
evolution or aging) based on data collected over a 2-year period. In particular, we
use a wide range of statistical and pattern analysis techniques to study the extent of
variations and whether they are statistically significant. We perform our analysis at
both feature and sample level and investigate how these variations are distributed
across the population, how they impact recognition error rates and how they interact
with different template update schemes. This analysis provides new insights into the
design of template update schemes as well as the possibility of attacks that exploit
the variations via template update schemes. To our knowledge, this is the first work
to study keystroke biometric aging effect. Results of the analysis will impact research
investigating template update strategies as well as motivate defenses against exploits
such as the adversarial template drifts.
2. We design and evaluate an attack mechanism that adversaries could employ
to defeat biometric verification systems which update users templates on a regular
basis. While this dissertation focuses on keystroke dynamics- based authentication,
we believe that our attack design offers some general insights into how other biometric
modalities could be attacked during the template update process. To our knowledge,
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this is the first work to investigate such a kind of attack in keystroke biometric
authentication systems, and we thus believe that our attack model will motivate a
new direction of research seeking to fortify template update schemes against abuse.
3. We propose a residual feature-based attack detection mechanism to identify
the fake updates from adversaries. The proposed detection method can protect a
biometric authentication system from drifting attacks without compromising the
updating performance. A thorough evaluation about how the proposed mechanism
protects and affects a biometric authentication system under attacks is presented.
Although analysis results are presented in the domain of keystroke dynamics, we
believe that our mechanism can be extended to other biometric modalities to prevent
adversarial template drifting.

CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
2.1 The Aging of Biometric Templates
Template aging refers to the increase in error rates caused by time-related
changes in the biometric pattern [30].

Biometric template aging degrades the

performance of a biometric system over time, since after a sufficiently long period, the
initial enrollment template of a certain subject substantially differs from his current
biometric samples, producing lower similarity to the initial template and increasing
error rates of the system. In machine learning, the term concept drift is often used to
refer to changes in the profile of the data distribution [65]. In biometrics, the drift
is often caused by aging, and previous studies have how template aging impacts a
biometric system.
Recent studies on human biometric aging traits were used for verification or
identification. [29] described a method to model aging variation on human faces
based on a statistic face model. The statistic face model was a combination of a
shape model and an intensity model, both generated from a list of training face image
with 50 parameters. In their work, the aging pattern is represented by an aging
function age = f(b) where b is the vector of the 50 parameters, and f is the quadratic
function. The function was trained for each individual to fit his/her aging pattern.
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They further tested the robustness of a face recognition system with aging simulation.
In the training phase, apart from the set of image used to train the face classifier, a
second set of image was used to generate the aging function for each individuals in
the database. In the test phase, given a face image, an appropriate aging function
was used to evaluate the age of the face and the recognition result was generated
along with the aging simulation. Their results showed that the improvement of the
classification rate was between 5% and 15% with aging simulation. In their following
works [27] [28], the focus was the development of artificial age progression algorithms
for forensics applications.
[15] analyzed the aging of iris biometrics with a dataset over a three-year period.
They compared the match scores distribution for short time-lapse iris image pairs,
with an average of one month apart between the enrollment image and testing image,
to the match score distribution for iris image pairs with one year, two years and
three year time-lapse. A clear evidence of template aging was noticeable with iris
images one year apart, with an average of 27% increment of false-reject-rate comparing
to the rate with short time-lapse images. Also, the false reject rate increased with
increasing time-lapse, and the average increments in false reject rate were 91% and
153% with images of two-year and three-year time-lapse, respectively. In a recent
study of biometric aging [47], a multiyear fingerprint dataset was evaluated. Results
presented the degrade of system performance without a template updating procedure.
A similar result on fingerprint biometric was shown in [64]. While recent works on
biometric template aging draw great attention to some modalities, such as face, iris
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and fingerprint, there has not been any work on the template aging problem in KD.
This dissertation will fill this gap.

2.2 Biometric Template Update
Template update mechanisms keep track of a user’s biometric pattern in order
to detect and compensate for variations which could degrade system performance. In
particular, such mechanisms use the latest user samples accepted by the system to
update a user’s profile. Two types of template update procedures are studied in the
literature: the supervised method and the semi-supervised method. We describe the
two methods in the following paragraphs.
In the supervised method input updating data are labeled by a supervisor to
ensure only genuine data are updated to user templates. [37] proposed two methods to
select user templates in fingerprint biometric, based on multiple enrollments, in order
to perform template updates. The first method first clusters the samples then picks
the representative sample in each cluster. The other method finds a batch of samples
with shorter distances to others. Both template selection and template updates are
operated offline, while template updates involves newly accepted genuine samples
labeled by the supervisor. An improvement of between 5% and 10% in false accept
rate, comparing to the results without template update, was presented with various
experimental settings. The supervised method is expensive since it requires updating
data to be labeled by human expert, or multiple enrollment sessions with attention of
users, not mentioning the additional operators to authenticate users in enrollments.
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The other option, the semi-supervised method, automatically updates user
templates with samples collected while the system is operating. In this method, the
updating data are selected based on the authentication decision, specifically, only
samples accepted by the verification system are eligible to apply template update. [23]
proposed a fingerprint verification system with online fingerprint template improvement.
Such systems merge the original user template during enrollment with input fingerprints
while the system is operating to update user templates. The updating threshold was
higher than the verification threshold to limit imposter updates. A recursive algorithm
decided the weights of the original template and the update sample while merging.
The improvement was presented as a significant reduction of error rates based on the
ROC curve, and a better representation in template minutiae.
The applications of template updating mechanism are not limited to the
academic area. Some of the recently released electronic devices use template updating
procedure to enhance their performance. As an example, both Apple’s FaceID [2] and
TouchID [1] perform template updating. FaceID updates user template either after
a succeeded face authentication, or a rejected face image is followed promptly by a
correctly typed backup passcode.
[34] build an experimental analysis to study the template update in face
verification. A “self-update” protocol was designed to update user templates with
unlabeled data, based on the verification results. With the initial template being
set, the rest of the face images are separated into prediction set, unlabeled set, and
test set. The prediction set is used to partitions users into different animal groups
in “Doddington’s Zoo” ([14]). The unlabeled set of each user is combined with the
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same amount of images from other users’ (imposters) unlabeled set, to operate the
“self-update”, and the system performance is tested with the test set. The threshold for
update is evaluated based on the initial template of each user. With the prediction set,
users are cluster into four types of animals: lamb, goat, wolf, and sheep, as described
in [14].
Lamb: Lambs are users who are vulnerable to imposter attack; their FRRs are
higher than others.
Goat: Goats are users who find it difficult to match against their own template.
Specifically, goats has higher FAR than other users.
Wolf: Wolves are users who can match well against other users, therefore, they
are considered strong attackers.
Sheep: Sheep are users who do not belong to any of the above groups. They
are users who generally have good verification performance.
[34] studied the template update effect to each of the four animal groups.
Results showed that lambs’ templates accepted more updates (65.7% of unlabeled
samples were updated) but a high proportion (43.2%) of the updated samples came
from imposters. On the other hand, goats had updated lowest amount of updated
samples (23.3%) but were less vulnerable to imposter updates (11.8% of imposter
updates).
[18] analyzed various template updating approaches in KD, with semi-supervised
methods. These approaches update user templates with newly enrolled samples. A
threshold was set to select the update samples, and such threshold is stricter than
the authentication threshold so that only highly genuine samples are picked. With
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two datasets in KD, the experimental results shows an improvement of around 45%.
Two ways of updating a user template were used: the sliding window and the growing
window. Both mechanisms are introduced by [24].
Sliding window : A sliding window updating mechanism uses a fixed template
size, i.e. the number of samples stored in the template is fixed. Once an eligible
updating sample is added to the system, the oldest sample in the template is removed.
Growing window : In this updating mechanism, the template size increases by
one sample when an eligible updating sample is added to the template since none of
the samples in the template is removed.
A recent study on adaptive keystroke system [66] put forward a keystroke
authentication system using template update and ”Doddington’s Zoo”. The system
first recognized a user’s category according to the animal based categories, then
adopted adaptive strategy to remedy problems of the user’s class. The sliding window
and the growing window mechanisms were applied, and their system achieved lower
than 1% of error rates.
The benefits from using a template update system have been shown in previous
studies. Some researchers pointed out that attackers could exploit the template update
to intrude a system, by creating fake updates (i.e. [34]) to drift user template. Such
adversaries will be described in the next section.

2.3 Adversary Template Drift
A weakness of the template updating scheme is that adversaries can exploit the
opportunities of template updates to manipulate user templates. In particular, if an
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attacker has some knowledge of a victim’s biometric pattern (i.e. snoops a biometric
sample from the victim), the attacker could poison the victim’s template by adding
carefully designed attack samples. As shown in some recent studies [61, 63], avoiding
imposter update in an adaptive biometric system could be challenging. [8] investigated
the poisoning attack in face biometrics. This attack send a set of fake face images
to the camera to gradually compromise a victim’s face template. With an image
from a victim, the attacker attempts to drift the victim’s template towards a targeted
template which was decided by the attacker. Each of the attack image was carefully
tuned so that each drift was small enough pass the verification. The presented results
showed that the attack increased the FAR of the system from 1% to between 5% and
10% with only 5 iterations, and up to 50% with 10 iterations; on the other hand, the
genuine users acceptance rate were degraded significantly. The design of the attack
requires that the attacker has the perfect knowledge of the verification system (i.e.
the verification algorithm, updating policy, victim’s templates). [7] further investigate
the scenario that the attacker only knows the verification algorithm and the updating
policy, with an estimation of victim’s template (i.e. a picture of a victim’s face from
the internet). The results showed that such attack has similar effectiveness to the
previous work, with more iterations as a trade-off.
Lovisotto et al. [48] proposed a “backdoor” procedure which allows a face
authentication system to accept an attacker’s face while minimizing the change of FAR
and FRR. The process was accomplished by injecting a series of carefully tuned face
images to a victim’s template. They claimed that the attack needs minimal knowledge,
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but the mechanism was build based on the assumption that the authentication system
was a face recognition system using DNN as the verifier.
All works discussed above showed the vulnerability of template updating
scheme in biometric verification systems. However, the requirement of the attacker’s
knowledge to the system (i.e. the verification algorithm, the updating policy) reduces
the feasibility of the attack. In this dissertation, a more general template drifting
attack is presented in KD, with minimal knowledge and skill requirements from the
attacker.

2.4 Defense for Template Drift Attacks
On the defense against such template-drifting attacks, very little research can
be found in the literature. The hill-climbing attacks have been reported [50] focusing
on brainwave biometric system attacks, which keeps trying different versions of a
user’s EEG biometric templates until it can eventually access the brainwave biometric
authentication system. The synthetic samples were adjusted and improved according
to the returned matching scores.
Template protection scheme can be implemented on biometrics system for
protecting the template-drifting attacks through cryptographic protocols [49, 51].
Gomez et al. [45] used the uniform score quantization to enhance the system security,
but it actually restricted the system’s template updating ability by setting the number
of the desired quantization levels. Giot et al. [19] tested a “two-threshold” updating
strategy in order to filter the attack samples. In particular, samples that were added
to the template need to satisfy an “updating threshold” which is stricter than the
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authentication threshold. Therefore, only the “highly genuine” samples were updated.
In this test, a mixed pool of genuine and imposter input samples were used to operate
the template updates. The amount of genuine sample was fixed, and the rate of
amount of imposter samples in the pool was decided by a parameter. In the enrollment
phase, the system created two templates which were the same for each user. In the
verification phase, each input sample compared with each of the two templates to
generate verification scores. The final score was the average of the two scores. An
authentication threshold decided whether the sample was accepted, and an updating
threshold further decided whether to use the sample to update user templates, if the
sample passed the authentication. The authentication threshold was the EER based
on the training, and two sets of updating threshold were used: 1) the EER threshold
which was the same as the authentication threshold, and 2) a threshold at 1% FAR.
The experimental results showed that a stricter threshold significantly reduced the
imposter update rate from around 10% to lower than 0.2%. On the other hand, the
genuine update miss rate was increased from around 20% to over 80%. These results
clearly showed that the “two-threshold” strategy limited the effect of imposter updates
by reducing numbers of imposter updates significantly. However, such mechanisms
may also affect the updating performance of the system since some genuine samples
were also rejected for updating.
Different from all prior efforts, in this dissertation we will propose a mechanism
to defend “poisoning” type of attacks without sacrificing the updating performance.

CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS OF BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE EVOLUTION
In this chapter we study the evolution (or aging) of keystroke biometrics
features over time. We use a range of pattern analysis and statistical methods for
this analysis. Observations made in this section form the basis for the attack designs
and performance evaluations to be undertaken in the proceeding sections. We first
describe the dataset used for these evaluations before giving details of the results of
our analysis.

3.1 Dataset Description
In this dissertation we use two keystroke dynamic datasets. One collected by
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU data), the other one collected by Louisiana Tech
University (LTU data). Descriptions follow.
CMU data: This is a public dataset with keystroke typing data for 51 users.
All data was collected on a laptop Windows computer with an external keyboard. The
data collection was splitted into 8 sessions, and users were allowed to complete only
one session each day. The time span of 8 sessions of data collection varies from one
week to one month. In each session, users were asked to type a 10-character phrase
.tie5Roanl’ for 50 times. A total of 400 typing repetitions were collected from each
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user. A Windows application was developed for the data collection. If a mistype
happens, users are prompt to type the phrase over again.
LTU data: The LTU data was collected in three sessions over two years, which
are fall 2009, fall 2010 and fall 2011. Totally 138 users joined all 3 sessions of data
collection. In each session, users are asked to type the same 58-character phrase
multiple times. The phrase was I am an undergraduate student of Louisiana Tech
University. Twelve repetitions of the phrase were collected in the first session (fall
2009), and 15 repetitions were collected in each of the second and the third session
(fall 2010 and fall 2011). All keystroke data was collected on a Windows PC with a
physical keyboard. A Windows application was developed to guide users to type. The
application displays a window with a line of text showing the word phrase, and a text
box below the line of text for users to type. Users need to correctly type the whole
phrase and hit Enter button to type the next repetition. If any mistype happens, a
single click of Backspace button will clear everything in the text box, and users need
to type the phrase over again. The keypress time and key release time of each of the
58 characters (including 8 space characters) were recorded by the application, and 58
KHT and 57 KIT were generated for each typing phrase.

3.2 Keystroke Verification Algorithms
Killourhy et al. [26] compared the performances of 14 keystroke verification
algorithms. They collected keystroke time data for typing password from 51 users.
Each user had 8 session of data with 50 repetitions in each session. The first 4 sessions
of data from each user were used to build the user template in the training phase,
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and the last 4 sessions built the testing set for both genuine test (200 repetitions of
genuine samples) and imposter test (keystroke samples from other 50 users). With each
keystroke verification algorithm, the anomaly score of testing samples are calculated,
and a comparison of 14 algorithms was generated based on the error rates. three
verifiers stood out to be best, which are: 1) Scaled Manhattan, 2) Outlier Count,
and 3) Nearest Neighbor. We apply the first verifier, Scaled Manhattan in this
dissertation. The second algorithm Relative is another well-known high-performance
KD verification algorithm that was first proposed by Gunetti et al. [3]. The latter
algorithm was particularly used to complement the first three algorithms because they
are all Euclidean distance-based. Details of the verification algorithms follow:
Scaled Manhattan Verifier (SM): This detector was described by Araujo
et al. [5] The training phase involves computing the mean and mean absolute deviation
of each feature in a user template, while the mean absolute deviation is calculated
with the following equation:

ai =

n
X

|µi − xij |/n

(3.1)

j=1

µi is the mean of the ith feature in the user template, xij is the ith feature value
of the j th sample in the template and n is the number of samples in the template.
The test phase involves computation of the anomaly score using the expression:

s=

m
X

|yi − µi |/ai

i=1

yi is the ith features of the test vector with m number of features.

(3.2)
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Relative Verifier (R): This verifier was described by [Bergadano et al., 2002].
In the training phase, the verifier computes the mean of each feature from a user
template. In the test phase the verifier assigns ranks to each of the elements in the
test and mean vectors, before computing the degree of disorder between the rank
vectors. The normalized degree of disorder equals the anomaly score.
Fusion Verifier (F): To further enhance the rigor of our performance analysis,
we experimented the fused verifier, since verifier fusion is known to improve the
performance of biometric classifiers [33, 34]. Note that our choice of the SM and R
verifiers for the fusion classifier was because the SM verifier was the best performing
verifier in the earlier mentioned study [26], while the R verifier, by virtue of being the
non-Euclidean verifier, should capture the users’ typing traits from a perspective that
complements that of the SM verifier.
Before fusing scores, we perform a genuine score centric normalization, in which
each score s is normalized to obtain a new score s0 , where s0 is calculated as:
s0 = (sµG)/σG

(3.3)

µG and σG are respectively the mean and standard deviation of the genuine
training scores. For all fusion we use the weighted sum-rule [11] with equal weights.

3.3 Analysis Results
In the following subsections we present results on different perspectives of
feature evolution over time. We first compare the distribution of feature changes
(Section 3.3.1). Details of the feature distributions were already introduced in Section

24
3.3.1. Following the distribution comparisons we perform statistical significance tests
to assess the significance of feature variations seen in each individual feature and
different sizes of feature vectors (Section 3.3.2). In the last part of this analysis, we
perform user classification using training and testing data collected at different points
in time to determine whether or to what extent the feature changes seen via the
significance tests translate into decrements in user classification accuracy.
3.3.1 Distribution of Feature Changes
Figures 3.1 are the CDFs of the absolute changes in users’ mean values for
each feature between 2009 and 2011. For an arbitrary user who participated in our
data collection experiments in both 2009 and 2010, the change in mean feature values
seen between 2009 and 2010 is computed as follows. Over the 12 instances provided in
2009, we compute the mean of each KHT and each KIT. Since there were 58 distinct
KITs and 57 distinct KHTs in the paraphrase used for our experiments, this process
creates a 57-dimensional vector and a 58-dimensional vector for each user. Over the
15 instances provided in 2010, the KHT mean vector and the KIT mean vector are
computed in the same way for each user. Finally, for each user a differences vector
is computed by subtracting the KHT mean vector computed from the 2009 dataset
from that computed for the 2011 dataset, with the same process repeated for the KIT
mean vector. The difference is computed as an absolute value. Figures 3.1 shows the
cumulative distribution of the values in the differences vectors over the population for
the KHTs while Figure shows a similar distribution for the KITs.
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Figure 3.1: CDF of User Feature Change in Milliseconds (ms) Across 3 Phases.
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These distributions provide insights into the changes seen in the different
features on average. Observe that the KITs depict much higher differences than the
KHTs; the differences seen with the KITs go as high as 200+ ms while those seen
with the KHTs only reach 40ms at most. This points to KITs being more unstable
than the KHTs over time. The figures further show that there were some changes
that were considerably higher than the mean change behavior. E.g., over 20% of the
differences in KHTs were more than 20ms while over 20% of the KITs were more than
80ms. From this graph it is not possible to determine whether these considerably
higher changes were due to user behavior or due to the identities of the keys typed.
However, the figures indicate the existence of a change, which we further analyzed in
terms of EERs and with the aid of statistical tests of significance to get a concrete
picture of these changes in user features.
3.3.2 Analysis with Tests of Significance
In the previous plots (Figure 3.1) we studied the evolution of each individual
feature in a user’s feature vector. Here, we study evolution from the perspective of an
entire feature vector. We did this in two ways:
Approach 1: In the first approach, we use the typing samples collected in
2009 (or 2010) to compute a vector of feature means for each user, and then compare
this vector with a similarly created feature-means vector built for the same user from
typing samples collected in a later year.
For many keystroke verification algorithms (e.g., see [26] for a survey), this
vector is the main building block of a user’s profile, and we thus believe it should
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be a plausible representation of a user’s typing pattern at any given point in time.
In the rest of this paper, we refer to this vector as the user’s profile. For a range
of string lengths between 8 and 58 characters, we run the K-S test for each user,
the null hypothesis being that the particular user’s reference profile for the string in
question does not vary significantly from the profile built using data collected in a
later year. These tests will give some answers as to whether a user could take up
different identities (in keystroke terms), if their profile was to be built at different
points in time.
Approach 2: In our second approach to studying keystroke feature vector
evolution, we test if each of the individual samples (feature vectors) provided by a
user in 2010/2011 differed significantly from the particular user’s reference profile.
Unlike the previous approach where the comparison between users’ profiles gave a
consolidated view of the evolution of a user’s keystroke traits, these tests will give
some insights into how well individual authentication attempts match with a profile
which was built years before the attempts are made. For the same range of string
lengths used in the previous tests, we run the tests using the feature vectors provided
by each user in the later years (2010 or 2011).
Thus while the first method uses one test per user per string length, the second
approach uses several tests per user per string (the number of tests depends on the
number of feature vectors provided by the user in the later year), the null hypothesis
in each case being that the feature vector under consideration does not significantly
differ from the user’s reference profile.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of the Percentage of Users’ Samples Significantly different
from an earlier profile.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of the P values from the significant tests.
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Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 summarizes our findings from these feature evolution
tests. In Figure 4-2, we plot the CDF of the percentage of the feature vectors (from
the 2010/2011 experiments) that depict a significant change when compared to the
respective users’ reference profiles. The reference profiles are either based on the
2009 dataset or the 2010 dataset. For example, the plot labeled 2009-2010 refers to
a reference profile which was built based on 2009 dataset while the profile used for
comparison was based on data collected in 2010.
Observe that for both KHTs and KITs, the percentage of feature vectors seeing
significant change increased with increasing string length. The increments seen with
the KITs are more subtle but still apparent from the plots. The figures generally
confirm that the longer strings are more likely to be associated with unstable keystroke
profiles than the shorter strings (See Figure 3.3 for the distribution of P values returned
from the hypothesis tests used to plot Figure DD. The critical value used was 0.05. P
values lower than 0.05 indicate rejection of the earlier described null hypothesis.)
Figure 3.4 shows the results for the experiments run following Approach
1:. The figure confirms the earlier observed trend, as the percentage of 2010/2011
user-profiles depicting significant variation from the respective users’ reference profiles
generally increases with increase in string length.
While it has previously been shown that aging of users’ features can degrade
the performance of a keystroke verifier [Killourhy and Maxion 2010], no previous
work has investigated how keystroke features age with time. Our results here provide
empirical evidence detailing the nature of keystroke template evolution over a long
period.
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We note that the discussion in this section applies to the evolution of keystroke
features from the statistical perspective and does not necessarily point to how/whether
feature evolution may result into authentication failure for the user in question. Next,
we address how the analyzed keystroke feature evolution patterns impact the classifier
Equal Error Rates.
3.3.3 Analysis of Equal Error Rate (EER) Performance
The performance of a keystroke verification algorithm is often measured with
error rates, specifically, false accept rate (FAR), false reject rate (FRR), and equal error
rate (EER). FAR is the probability that a biometric verification system incorrectly
accept a verification attempt by an unauthorized user. The FAR typically is calculated
as the number of false acceptance divided by the number of access attempts by
imposters. FRR is the probability that a system incorrectly rejects an access attempt
from a genuine user. FRR is calculated as the number of false rejects divided by the
number of verification attempts by genuine users. EER is the rate at which the FAR
and the FRR are equal. EER can be obtained by the ROC curve, as in Figure 3.5.
To measure the performance of the keystroke verification algorithms, we
generate the anomaly score of each testing sample, and the FAR and FRR depend on
how the threshold of the anomaly score is chosen. The choice of threshold establishes
the operating point of the verifier on the ROC curve. Over the continuum of possible
thresholds, the ROC curve illustrates the FAR and FRR that would be attained at
each possible detector operating point. EER is then calculated as in the intersection
of the ROC curve and the line F AR = F RR.
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Figure 3.5: An example ROC curve. The curve shows the trade-off between the false
accept rate (FAR) and the false reject rate (FRR). The intersection is the equal error
rate (EER).
Figure 3.6 shows the impact of template aging on classifier performance. Three
classification algorithms have been used for this analysis, i.e., Scaled Manhattan
algorithm (SM) [], R verifier (R) [] and a fusion of the R and SM verifiers based on
the weighted sum rule (F)[].
For each algorithm we perform training and testing in three different scenarios:
1. Data collected from each user in 2009 is divided into two portions; one of which
is used for training and the other for testing. 5 samples typed in 2009 are
augmented with 15 samples generated by a Monte Carlo simulation to create a
training set of 20 samples. Testing is based on 7 samples collected in 2009.

40

40

30

30

20
8−Char
20−Char
40−Char

10
0
2009

2010
Testing Session

EER%

EER%

34

20

0
2009

2011

(a) SM KHT

EER%

30

8−Char
20−Char
40−Char

30

10

10

2010
Testing Phase

0
2009

2011

2011

40

8−Char
20−Char
40−Char

30

20
10
0
2009

2010
Testing Phase

(d) R KIT

EER%

EER%

30

8−Char
20−Char
40−Char

20

(c) R KHT
40

2011

40

20

0
2009

2010
Testing Phase

(b) SM KIT

EER%

40

8−Char
20−Char
40−Char

10

8−Char
20−Char
40−Char

20
10

2010
Testing Phase

(e) F KHT

2011

0
2009

2010
Testing Phase

2011

(f) F KIT

Figure 3.6: EER performance with different testing phase. 20 training samples are
generated with MC.
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2. Training is done similarly to scenario 1 while all 15 samples collected in 2010
are used for testing.
3. Training is done similarly to scenario 1 while all 15 samples collected in 2011
are used for testing.

Figure 3.6 (a), (c) and (e) show the performance of the classifiers when training
and testing was done based on KHTs respectively extracted from an 8-character string,
a 20-character string and a 40-character string. The figures show that for all 3 verifiers,
the classifier Equal Error Rates were lowest for scenario 1, followed by scenario 2 and
highest for scenario 3. The same trend is seen when the features used were KITs
(see Figure 4-5 (b), (d) and (f)), and when the Monte Carlo simulation was used to
produce 50 samples (see Figure 3.7) as opposed to 20 samples. The reason behind this
trend is that as time went by, each user’s features underwent a drift, which resulted in
worsening classification performance over time. In all cases the fusion verifier performs
at least as well as the individual verifiers, however, it still depicts the same trend.
These results provide solid evidence for the evolution of users’ templates over time,
and the need for template update mechanisms to remedy this situation.
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Figure 3.7: EER performance with different testing phase. 50 training samples are
generated with MC.

CHAPTER 4
DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE
FROG BOILING ATTACK
4.1 Design of Attack
The previous section has shown evidence for the evolution of keystroke features
over time. A standard solution to this kind of problem is the usage of template update
mechanisms. Such mechanisms make corrective changes to a user’s template when the
user’s features are deemed to have changed significantly relative to the stored template.
While ours is the first work to provide concrete insights into the evolution of user’s
keystroke features over time, there are interestingly already some existing proposals
on corrective mechanisms (or template update mechanisms) against template aging.
In this section we investigate the notion that these corrective mechanisms can be
exploited to inject malicious samples into the template. Specifically, we design an
attack called a frog-boiling attack that seeks to stealthily drift a user’s features. We
evaluate the performance and practicality of the attack in different settings.
Rubinstein et al.

[43] introduced the term ”Boiling Frog” as a type of

poisoning attacks in which ”the adversary slowly, but increasingly, poisons the principal
components by adding small amounts of chaff, in gradually increasing quantities.”
Chan-Tin et al.[9] coined the term Frog-Boiling attack in reference to an attack which
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uses a sequence of carefully tuned fake updates to stealthily perturb the coordinate
system of a network. This stealthy modification of the coordinates is likened to the
tale of a frog which ended up being boiled in water just because the temperature
was increased in very small undetectable steps. In this dissertation, we adapt the
philosophy of the Frog-Boiling attack to the domain of keystroke based verification.
In particular, our frog-boiling attack is built upon the following assumptions:
1. an adversary who is able to snoop on a user’s typing session and use the captured
timing data to synthesize and replay authentication attempts with the aid of
software tools (i.e. key-loggers and keystroke generators); and
2. a keystroke verification system that uses template updates to correct variations
seen in a user’s template over time (i.e., template aging).

Figure 4.1: Idea of the Frog-Boiling attack. Attacker intends to drift a user template
(gray circle on the left) to a target, by inserting fake samples (red crosses) to a user
template.

Figure 4.1 presents the general idea of the Frog-Boiling attack. The gray circle
on the left represents the original template of a KD user. The Frog-Boiling attacker
seeks to drift the user template towards some target template, using carefully tuned
fake samples which marginally deviate from the user’s own samples. This marginal
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variation from the user’s own template helps fool’ the system into accepting them,
with the cumulative impact of these samples eventually aimed to transform the user’s
template into a target template that is very different from that of the genuine user.
An example of the target template could be a template that belongs to the attacker
(that would eventually give the attacker unfettered access to the system), or some
generic weak template aimed to degrade the authentication performance of a user.

Figure 4.2: Idea of the Frog-Boiling attack. Attacker intends to drift a user template
(gray circle on the left) to a target, by inserting fake samples (red crosses) to a user
template.

Figure 4.2 is a flow chart of the Frog-Boiling attack. A list of fake samples
is generated based on a snooped user sample and a target template chosen by the
attacker. These samples are well-tuned to create a drift to a victim’s template, while
staying in the range to be verified by the system. Gaussian random noise is added to
the samples to create some randomness, hence avoiding suspicion. Algorithm 1 shows
a formal view of the attack.
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Input: F, D̄, N, n
Input: σ = {σ1 , σ2 , · · · , σn }
∆ ← (D̄ − F )/N ;
for i← 1 to P do
//P iterations in total
for j← 1 to n do
x ← N (1, σj );
if i ≤ N then
F 0 ← (F + (i − 1) · ∆) · x;
end
else
F 0 ← (F + N · ∆) · x;
end
//attack vector
if Verification(F 0 ) == true then
//verifier accepts vector F 0
v ← 1; break();
end
end
if v 6= 1 then
break(); //Abort attack
end
end
ALGORITHM 1: The Frog-Boiling Attack
Given a user with a keystroke template denoted by S, the Frog-Boiling attack
(see Algorithm 1) seeks to transform S towards a destination template D, where D
stands for an arbitrary keystroke template, which could, for instance, be built from
the attacker’s own keystroke features, or from data collected from several users over
a population. We shall refer to the latter form of the destination template D, as a
Population Template, and the former as a User-specific Template.

F0 =




 x · (F + (i − 1) · ∆), 1 ≤ i ≤ N


 x · (F + N · ∆),

i>N

(4.1)
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Equation 4.1 generalizes the feature vector F 0 , used to make the ith Frog-Boiling
attempt. F represents the feature vector that the adversary directly synthesizes
from data collected during the initial keylogging process (see Assumption 1), while
∆ = (D̄ − F )/N is the vector of small latency modifications being used to slowly drift
S towards D with the aid of the Sliding Window template update mechanism. D̄ is a
vector whose elements are obtained by computing the mean values of the different
features in the template D, while the scalar N represents an arbitrary number of
small steps used during the first stage of the template transformation (i.e., the stage
represented by the interval 1 ≤ i ≤ N in Equation 4.1).
The noise term x is added to make each forged feature value appear random,
since a set of regularly spaced feature values could easily raise suspicion. We model the
noise using the Gaussian random variable with fixed mean, 1, and standard deviation
σj ∈ {σ1 , σ2 , · · · , σn }, where σ1 > σ2 > · · · > σn . The default value of σj is set such
that σj = σ1 , the lower values of σj being used only when the forged feature vector F 0
fails to authenticate against the victim’s template.
In these cases of failed authentication, where the forged feature vector F 0 fails
to authenticate against the victim’s template, the Frog-Boiling attack stipulates a total
of n re-authentication attempts, for which the standard deviation of the noise term is
reduced after each failed authentication. Reduction of the noise term is done through
use of a lower standard deviation for the Gaussian variable X. If authentication still
fails after the n times, the attack against that particular user is aborted. For the
attacks in this work we used n = 5, since many password authentication systems
permit an average of 5 failed authentication attempts before initiating additional
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defensive measures. Details of the other attack parameters are discussed in Section
4.3.

4.2 Baseline Evaluation
Before evaluating the attack, we performed a set of baseline experiments whose
results will serve as a reference point to gauge the impact of the Frog-Boiling attack.
These experiments were based on data collected from the first 46 of the 51 users,
as samples collected from the remaining 5 users were reserved for the design of the
Frog-Boiling attack. The steps followed for each user in the training and testing
process of the baseline experiments are listed below:
1. With one of the first 46 users designated as a genuine user, the other 45 users
are designated as the impostors. Data collected from the first 2 typing sessions
of the genuine user (equivalent to 100 typing repetitions) is then used to train
each of the six verifiers.
2. To generate genuine scores of a given genuine user, data from Sessions 3
(equivalent to 50 typing repetitions) is used to attempt the user’s model.
3. Finally to generate impostor scores, data from the first five typing attempts of
each impostor in Sessions 3 is used to attack the genuine user’s model.
Table 4.1: The mean (µEER ) and standard deviation (σEER ) of the EER of each of
the 3 verifiers at baseline. EERs are expressed as a percentage.

µEER
σEER

SM
13.29
7.73

R
18.10
9.20

Fusion
9.97
6.10
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Table 4.1 summarizes the performance of the classifiers in terms of their EER
at baseline. The fusion verifier performs the best, and SM verifier performs better
among the two single verifiers. The next section details the attack process, and how
the baseline performances of the different verifiers are affected by the attack.

4.3 Attack Settings
We perform two types of Frog-Boiling attack: the user-specific attack, for which
the target template is a specific attacker, and the population attack, for which the
target template is the average of a population. For both biometric systems, the last
five users in each dataset are designated as the attackers, and the Population template
is computed based upon the profiles of the last 5 users. The snooped samples used to
initiate the attack are obtained from Session 4 of the keystroke victim.
The standard deviation of the noise distribution is drawn from the set σ =
[0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1], while N = 100 and P = 300 (see Algorithm 1, for meanings
of parameters). The large value of N ensures that the individual template drifts
causing the transition from S to D are sufficiently small, while the large value of P
enables the victim’s template to eventually get completely flushed by samples from the
Frog-Boiling attack attempts made when the counter variable, i, is such that i > N
(see Equation 4.1). We set N = 100 and P = 200.
We perform the Frog-Boiling attack in two scenarios, the so-called pure attack
and mixed attack. With pure attacks, all authentication attempts during the FrogBoiling attacks are attack samples, hence the attacks proceed while a victim is not
using the system. The results of the pure attacks will show the full potential of the
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Frog-Boiling attack. However, a large amount of attack attempts during a short
amount of time could be suspicious (considering a victim may still use the system
occasionally). If the attack could proceed without interrupting a victims normal usage,
the intrusion would be more difficult to detect. Therefore, we also investigate the
more challenging and demanding mixed attack, in which the biometric system receives
both genuine and attack attempts. A prior study [36] used the Poisson distribution to
model users’ login behaviors, and we use a similar approach in this work.
In our experiments, Poisson random numbers that represent the instant at
which a login attempt is made are generated for both genuine and attack attempts
using Equation 4.2, with λ = 2500. n represents the number of attempts generated.
In our experiment, nG = 300 for genuine samples, nA = 150, 300, or 600 for attack
samples, which correspond to the ratios between the genuine and the imposter attempts
as 2:1, 1:1, or 1:2, respectively. With pure attack we flush victims’ template with 200
attack samples. With mixed attack, we use a virtual timeline to show the process
of the attack. All the genuine and attack attempts are Poisson distributed on the
timeline, and the process of the attack lasts 200 time units with keystroke system. The
expected numbers of genuine attempts (through the Poisson random generator) within
the timeline are 200, and the expected numbers of attack attempts varies based on the
mixed rate. Note that even we use fixed rates on the amount of genuine and attack
samples, since all the attempts are randomly generated, there could be consecutive
genuine or attack attempts.
[x1 , x2 , · · · , xn ] = P(λ)

(4.2)
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Table 4.2: The mean and standard deviation of the EERs for the three verifiers after
the Frog-Boiling attack. EERs are expressed as percentage.
Attacker
Attacker #1
Attacker #2
Attacker #3
Attacker #4
Attacker #5
Population attack

SM
64.27 (23.51)
62.28 (21.98)
56.77 (33.19)
52.37 (25.93)
53.85 (21.96)
54.80 (23.98)

Verifier
R
37.43 (34.46)
30.48 (27.44)
20.65 (29.67)
16.09 (17.94)
23.04 (25.65)
20.59 (10.83)

Fusion
47.43 (40.79)
47.52 (36.04)
24.00 (31.78)
22.83 (26.88)
32.11 (30.71)
26.62 (13.07)

4.4 Attack Results
Table 4.2 summarizes the performance of the three verifiers after the full
Frog-Boiling attack was launched. To compute the EERs, we subject the victim’s
transformed template to the same training and genuine-score generation procedure
that was used in Section 4.2, but generate the impostor scores using the attackers’
samples from session 2 (50 repetitions). Impostor samples are perturbed with noise
before the attack is launched. A total of 1000 impostor attempts are made.
Table 4.2 generally reveals that all classifiers see increased EERs as a result of
the attack. The EER increments vary across attackers, since, for instance, attacker
#1 causes EER increments as high as 400% (e.g., SM verifier, from 13.29 (see Table
4.1) to 64.27 (Table 4.2), Fusion verifier, from 9.97 (Table 4.1) to 47.43 (Table 4.2),
etc.), while attacker #5 affects all verifiers just slightly. This trait is a direct result of
our attack model, in which the victim’s destination template directly depends on the
attacker’s template. As such, an attacker with a weak destination template should,
with high likelihood cause higher EER increments than an attacker with a strong
template.
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Another interesting observation about the results in Table 4.2 is that the R
verifier, which performed worst at baseline, appears to resist the attack more than
the other verifiers. This could be because the R verifier’s mechanism rotates around
the relative ranks of the features (see Section 3.2 for its description), yet the SM
specifically focus on the magnitudes of the feature values, which are directly modified
by the Frog-boiling attack.
The relatively good performance of the A-fusion verifier could also be attributed
to the resistance of the R verifier (which is one of the individual verifiers used in the
fusion) to the attack. Meanwhile, the significant performance degradation seen by
the S-fusion verifier was likely because the set of well-performing users that are not
considered for fusion by this verifier could have changed into weak users after the FrogBoiling attack. This observation suggests that in an adversarial environment, S-fusion
verifiers would have to be dynamic, continuously monitoring users’ performance after
enrollment. The implication of the S-fusion verifier’s behavior under attack is that
for biometrics modalities where a template update scheme could be abused, user’s
the distinction between good and poor users would have to be continuously done, as
opposed to biometric performance would have to be continuously monitored.
Next, we investigate the impact of the attack on the user groups (or animals)
specified by the biometric menagerie. The biometric menagerie is a categorization
of users of a biometric system into groups depending on how well or poorly a user
performs.
Grouping these animals depends on a set of thresholds that express how well
users authenticate on the system. In this work we fix these thresholds that we find to
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partition the users according to their classification performance. A similar approach
was also used in [34]. We classify users whose mean genuine scores are above the
89th percentile as goats, and those whose mean impostor scores are below the 33rd
percentile as lambs. Our analysis will focus on these two classes since they generally
represent the weak users, whose proportion at different stages of the Frog-Boiling
attack will help demonstrate the impact of the attack.
Figure 4.3 captures the attack victims’ template transformations as a function
of the genuine and impostor scores, after different iterations of the Frog-Boiling attack.
The destination template in this case is that of Attacker #1 (User #47). The solid
vertical line represents the goats threshold, while the solid horizontal line represents
the lambs threshold. For each verifier (i.e., each row), the first graph gives the baseline
performance before the Frog-Boiling attack was launched, the other plots capturing
steps number 50, 100, 200 and 300 of the attack.
By step number 100, all classifiers see a marked increase in the number of lambs,
while an increased number of goats takes a much larger number of steps. This slow
increment in the number of goats is likely because the attack employs very small feature
modifications, which enables the genuine users to continue to match well against their
templates after the first few (say, 100) attacks. On the other hand, the fast increase in
the number of lambs could be because a sequence of forged authentication attempts
increases the extent of variability of the victim’s template, while at the same time
decreasing the distance between each pair of genuine and impostor feature vectors.
Respective increment and decrement of these two variables then results into a decrease
of the impostor scores (see Section 3.2 for score computation formulae).
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Figure 4.3: Menagerie transitions due to the frog-boiling attack launched with Attacker
#1’s (User #47’s) template as the destination template. Each cross represents one
of the 46 victims. The right side partition of each graph contains goats, while the
bottom segment of each graph contains lambs. A user could be both a goat and a
lamb. Column 1 to 5 represents the original user status before attack, and the 50th,
100th, 150th, and 200th iterations of Frog-Boiling attacks. All scores shown on the
plot are normalized.
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Another attribute of the attack depicted by Figure 4.3 is that some users
completely resist the animal transformations (e.g., second user from the top axis of
Figure 4.3 (c)), while others see transformations only during the first few stages of
the attack (e.g., first user from the top axis). This aspect of the Frog-Boiling attack is
crucial for the obfuscation of the attack, since an attack-induced transformation of
all victims to a common category/animal (as specified by the destination template),
would likely ease the task of detecting the attack. In practice however, it is noteworthy
that the attack could be tweaked to transform as many users’ templates as possible
(e.g., by using a greater number of re-authentication attempts during failed attacks,
using very small template modifications at each stage, etc.) depending on the aims of
the adversary.
A counter-argument that could be raised against the practical implications of
the results depicted by Figure 4.3 is that, the 50+ steps required for the attack to
cause a significant effect is too high to go undetected in a real system. To address this
question, we note that as long as a computer system is compromised by malware, the
question of a bot logging into a site multiple times is not an insurmountable challenge
today (e.g., see [52]). Additionally, we note that for verifiers built to use 8 to 30
samples during template building (see [26] for a survey), the process of flushing the
template should certainly take a much fewer number of steps than those used in this
work. We are mostly compelled to use templates containing 100 typing samples (and
thus 100+ steps for the attack), because of the large size of the dataset we used.
Up to this point, we have not addressed the question of how long users continue
to log into their accounts during the course of the attack. If users fail to log onto

50

1
SM
R
Fusion

FRR

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

50

100

150

200

Frog-Boiling attack step
(a) False Rejection Rate (FRR)

0.5

FAR

0.4

0.3
SM
R
Fusion

0.2

0.1
0

50

100

150

200

Frog-Boiling attack step
(b) False Acceptance Rate (FAR)

Figure 4.4: The changes of average FRR and FAR during the process of the frog-boiling
attack, with Attacker #1’s profile as the destination template.
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Table 4.3: EER of the keystroke verification system under the frog-boiling attack with
mixed attempts.
Mixed Rate
Mixed 2:1
Mixed 1:1
Mixed 1:2

Attacker #1
SM
R
Fusion
20.70 19.74 13.91
31.34 24.57 26.08
40.47 28.04 32.53

Population Attack
SM
R
Fusion
20.63 19.98 12.11
27.15 22.45 24.55
32.51 26.53 30.84

their accounts after just a few steps of the template transformation process, the attack
could be easily detected and precluded in its early stages. On the other hand, if
users still access their accounts during the course of the attack, the adversary could
expose users’ profiles to intrusion by both synthetic and zero-effort impostors (after
weakening their templates) for a long time before detection. Figure 4.4 gives some
insights into this aspect of the attack, where we show the evolution of system FRR
and FAR during the frog-boiling attack. FRR are calculated with the same genuine
testing set as in baseline test, and the samples to generate FARs are subtracted from
the attacker’s own typing sample. For all verifiers, the users represented in Figure 4.4
see very little change in their FRRs up to a number of attacks somewhere between
50 and 100. Meanwhile, the FAR begins to increase sharply after just a few attacks.
This trend in error rates shows that the likelihood of an attacker accessing a user’s
account increases fast while the likelihood that a genuine user fails to access their
own accounts only starts to get high after a very large number of attacks. Next, we
test the attack performance with the mixed attack scenario, and see how the attack
performs while victims keep using the system during the attack process.
Table 4.3 summarizes the EER performance of the keystroke verification system
under the Frog-Boiling attack with both genuine and attack attempts. Although the
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EERs are not as high as the results with pure attack (Table 4.2), we see an increased
EER over the baseline. For example, with Attack #1’s template as the destination
template, the EER performance of SM verifier has over 200% increment over baseline
(from 13.29% to 40.47%), and the Fusion verifier has over 220% increment on EER.
Similar to the results in Table 4.2, although the R verifier performs the worst at
baseline, it has the lowest EER after the Frog-Boiling attack, due to the nature of
the verifier being non-Euclidean. Additionally, we could observe the trend that when
attack samples share a larger proportion in all the authentication attempts, the EER
after attack is higher, which indicates a greater impact from the frog-boiling attack.
This trend shows that the attacker should generate sufficient amount of attack samples
in order to create an effective attack. However, a more frequent attack rate would
also raise the suspicion, and when the victim’s attempts share the majority (in which
case the attack would unlikely be detected), the attack has little to no impact to the
system.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the menagerie transitions due to the frog-boiling
attack in mixed attack scenario, and the mixed rates are 1:2. Figure 4.5 are generated
with Attacker #1’s template as the destination template and Figure 4.6 shows the
transition with population attack. It is observed that the users are moving from the
top left section (sheep) to the right section (goat) or bottom section (lamb), a similar
trend as shown in Figure 4.3. We see an increased number of goats with all verifiers
when the system suffers from 200 time unit of attacks (i.e., the most right column).
Comparing with the three verifiers, users have the least menagerie transition with R
verifier. This matches the results we have in Table 4.3.
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Figure 4.5: Menagerie transitions due to the frog-boiling attack launched with Attacker
#1’s (User #47’s) template as the destination template, with mixed attack rate of 1:2.
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Figure 4.6: Menagerie transitions due to the frog-boiling attack launched with the
population template as the destination template, with mixed attack rate of 1:2.
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Figure 4.7: The changes of FAR and FRR over time during frog-boiling attack to the
keystroke verification system. Each figure shows results of three verifiers with mixed
attack, with mixed rate of 1:2.
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Figure 4.7 shows the change of FRR and FAR with mixed attack (i.e., mix
rate of 1:2) from Attack #1. All verifiers see an increased FRR and FAR because of
the attack. However, most of the changes occur after 100 time steps. Comparing the
results with the pure attack, the mixed attack takes more attacks to make impact to
the system. Although the R verifier (in red) performs the best against the frog-boiling
attack, the error rates changed by the attack occur prior to the other two verifiers.
We have shown how the Frog-Boiling attack can effectively intrude a keystroke
biometric systems with both error rate increments and menagerie transitions. In the
next chapter, we will describe our proposed defensive mechanism, the residual-based
detector, against the Frog-Boiling attack.

CHAPTER 5
RESIDUAL BASED DETECTOR AGAINST THE
FROG-BOILING ATTACK
Through the frog-boiling attack, attackers can generate the attacking samples
extremely similar to the genuine user templates but with slight differences and thus can
gradually drift the original template towards a target template by template updating.
So it is imperative to develop an effective defense mechanism which can effectively
identify the differences between the genuine user templates and the drifting attacker
templates. In this chapter, we will describe a residual-based detector to prevent
suspicious updates to the system.

5.1 Residual Distribution Features
Inspired by the existing work in steganography [44], we propose a new approach
to detect the frog-boiling attack, specifically to identify those attack samples that
have a very high level of similarity as the genuine samples, leveraging the statistical
residue distribution features. The rationale of this approach is to capture the intrinsic
dependency within the original genuine samples. Such dependency will be altered or
even lost when artificial attack samples are synthesized or generated based on the
genuine samples. Figure 5.1 (a) depict the average correlation levels corresponding
to the varying distances between any two sample points within 300 samples. It is
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(a) Correlation between sample points of keystrokes

(b) Cumulative density distribution of residuals for genuine
samples, attack samples, and mixed attack samples of
keystrokes

Figure 5.1: Correlation and residual distribution for keystroke samples
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shown that both types of data show strong correlation (i.e., dependency) among a
small set of closely adjacent sample points (e.g., correlation coefficient > 0.9). Such
dependency will drop dramatically as the increase of the distance between any two
sample points.
The residual among i adjacent sample points is defined as:
Ri = X̂i (Ni ) − cX̄i

(5.1)

For each feature (n represent the index of the corresponding feature), the first-order
and second-order residuals are extracted as follows:
n
R1n (i) = Xi+1
− Xin

(5.2)

n
n
− 2Xin
R2n (i) = Xi−1
+ Xi+1

(5.3)

Xin represents the nth feature value in the ith sample. So the corresponding first order
residual R1n (i) is calculated by the difference between Xin and its following sample’s
n
nth feature Xi+1
. The second-order residual R2n (i) is the difference between the sum of
n
n
ith sample’s neighbors’ nth feature value Xi−1
and Xi+1
minus Xin times by 2. Then

a probability density distribution is calculated based on k (k is the block size, k ∈ N )
residuals in the first and second order. Figure 5.1 (b) shows the cumulative density
distribution of the 1st-order residuals for the Feature 18 in the genuine samples of
Subject S002 and the frog-boiling attack samples to S002. It is observed that, there are
distinguishable differences of the residual distributions among the genuine samples (in
blue), the pure attack samples (in red) and the mixed attack samples (in green). It is
shown that the residual distribution of the genuine samples has a smoother transition
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over a relative larger interval, unlike the sharp transition seen for the attack samples,
which indicates the manipulating nature of the attack samples. For each feature of
keystroke data, a residual distribution will be generated and used as the inputs of the
classifier (to be detailed in the next section).
In our prior work [46], we explored the use of residual distributions to differentiate the genuine ERP samples against the synthesized ERP samples by injecting
a very small level of Gaussian noises onto the authentic samples. In this study,
residual distribution is adopted as an effective tool to represent the dependency nature
of sample points and identify the differences of sample points between the genuine
samples and the more demanding frog-boiling attack samples.

5.2 Design of the Residual Based Detector
5.2.1 Random Forest Ensemble Classifier
Due to the high variance in keystroke data and the large dimension of the
residual distribution features, a classifier could be easily over-fitted. Moreover, the
residual distribution features often possess different importance levels. For example, the
residual distributions of some sample features may demonstrate a clear distinguishable
difference between the genuine data and the attack data, such type of residual
distributions shall play more important role (i.e., have higher weight) in recognizing
the attack samples. Therefore, in this study we propose to use the Random Forest
Ensemble Classifier (RFEC) which has been proven to be effective in handling
high variance, high dimensional data; be resistant to over-fitting; and be able to
estimate the feature importance. RFEC is an aggregation of multiple weak classifiers
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{h(X, Θk ), k = 1, 2...K}, where Θk is the parameter set of the individual decision
tree k, and K represents the number of trees. The forming process of a RFEC and
principle of feature importance estimation by RFEC are as follows:
1. K subsets are randomly extracted from the original training dataset via bootstrapping [42]. Corresponding to these K subsets, K decision trees are constructed and trained. For each extraction, the subset which is not chosen is
named as “Out-of-Bag” (OOB) data (OOBk );
2. For each decision tree, if there are n features, each time m features are extracted
(m ≤ n). The decision tree keeps choosing and splitting the “most significant”
feature (f ∈ m) until it is fully grown;
3. Aggregation at decision-making is realized through the majority voting of these K
decision trees with weights wk (wk ∝

1
,
E(OOBk )

in which E is the error estimation

function);
4. The feature importance estimation is calculated by permuting one feature across
OOB data and measuring how worse the MSE of RFEC predictions becomes
after the permutation.
Fully growing each decision tree allows RFEC to be capable of processing high
dimensional features. The creation of splits is then based on a random set of bootstrap
samples, which help reduce variance and avoid over-fitting. The majority voting with
wk aggregation method makes RFEC resistant to over-fitting and effective in handling
high variance data. With the importance estimation of the random forest, a filtering
and retraining model similar to the gene selection [41] is designed as follows: In every
iteration, according to the importance estimation result, part of the less important
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Figure 5.2: The flow diagram of the proposed two-layer defense mechanism
features are filtered out and discarded, a new RFEC is then trained with the remaining
feature set. Through the testing of the validation data, the RFEC which performs the
best and the corresponding feature set is kept. In this case, for different subjects, the
most suitable and important feature set can be identified and chosen for training the
classifier.
5.2.2 Two-Layer Defense Mechanism
In some circumstances, data received by the authentication system is mixed
with the samples from both the attacker and the genuine user. In this case, a single
binary or ternary (three categories including genuine samples, attack samples, and
mixed samples) RFEC is not capable of distinguishing the mixed data. However, the
transitions from the genuine user to the attacker, and vice versa, can produce some
high amplitude residuals which will result in a much wider residual distribution than
the one of the genuine user or the attacker. For instance, according to Figures 5.1
(b), it is observed that the mixed data’s residual distribution (in green) is remarkably
deviated from the distributions of the genuine samples (in blue) and the attack samples
(in red). On the other side, although all centered around the value of zero, the residuals
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of the genuine samples and the attack samples still demonstrate distinct distributions.
Based upon these observations, a two-layer defense mechanism is proposed in this
study, as illustrated in Figure 5.2. Any input sample will pass through the first RFEC
(“RF-mix”) which distinguishes the mixed data and the pure data (including both the
genuine and attack samples), and the identified pure data will be further processed by
the second RFEC (“RF-attack”) to distinguish the genuine data and the attack data.

5.3 Evaluation and Performance of Residual Distribution based
Two-Layer Defense Mechanism
To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed two-layer, residual
distribution based defense mechanism (see Figure 5.2) for the Frog-Boiling attacks on
biometric authentication systems, we develop the evaluation protocols based on the
keystroke dynamics biometrics investigated in this study.
5.3.1 Experiment Setting
RF-mix: an RFEC with the goal of distinguishing the mixed data and the pure
data.
Training: RF-mix is trained with the mixed data and the pure data for each
user. The pure data consists of the genuine keystroke data from sessions 2 to 5 and
the attacking samples generated by Gaussian random noises. The mixed samples
is created with a mix of both pure data sources. Genuine and attack samples are
uniformly random ordered in the training data.
Testing: RF-mix is tested with the genuine samples from sessions 6 to 8, the
frog-boiling attack samples and the mixed test data from the general population or a
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Table 5.1: Performance of RF-mix, RF-attack and Two-Layer Classifiers
FAR
Classifiers

FRR

RF-mix
RF-attack
Two-Layer

1.73a /1.8b
7.25
8.53

Pure
Attack
pop A1
N/A
1.75 1.37
1.37 0.98

Mix
1:2
pop
A1
17.82 16.24
49.55 50.88
14.15 12.80

Note: a for pure genuine and population attack samples,
samples.

b

Mix
1:1
pop
A1
20.34 19.53
62.39 65.54
15.24 16.71

Mix
2:1
pop
A1
23.67 22.58
70.86 67.45
26.83 27.80

for pure genuine and user-specific attack

specific user (for population attack or user-specific attack, respectively). The mixed
test data is generated with a mix of the genuine samples and the attack samples with
varying proportions, and is Poisson randomly distributed.
RF-attack: a second RFEC for categorizing data into the genuine or attack samples.
Training: RF-attack is trained with the genuine data and the attack data for
each user. With 8 sessions of the genuine keystroke data from each user, we train the
RF-attack with sessions 2 to 5 (200 keystroke repetitions for each user) as the genuine
training set. Keystroke samples in session 1 are discarded because it is found that the
residuals in session 1 are very unstable given the nature of practicing an unfamiliar
set of keystrokes. For attack training set, we randomly generate 10 attack training
samples from each genuine training sample with Gaussian random noises.
Testing: RF-attack is tested with the genuine samples from session 3 (50
repetitions) and the frog-boiling attack samples. We perform both the user-specific
attack and the population attack in the testing. The frog-boiling attack test samples
are generated in the same way as Section 4.3.
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5.3.2 Experimental Results
Table 5.1 summarizes the performance of the proposed classifiers (including
the RF-mix, the RF-attack, and the two-layer structure) when provided with the pure
genuine samples, the pure frog-boiling attack samples, and the mixed samples with
varying proportions (the ratios between the genuine and the attack samples are 1 : 1,
1 : 2, and 2 : 1, respectively).
The goal of the RF-mix classifier is to distinguish the pure data (including both
the genuine and attack samples) and the mixed data, which works as a preprocessing
filter to detect and remove the more challenging and demanding mixed data samples.
To maximumly retain the genuine samples for updating the authentication system,
we give a higher priority to the FRR (i.e., the percentage of pure data including
both genuine and attack samples that are falsely labeled as the mixed data and thus
discarded) than the FAR (i.e., the percentage of mixed data samples that are falsely
labeled as the pure data and are further sent to RF-attack for processing). It is
shown that, RF-mix classifier achieves a very low level of FRR (< 2%) as well as
an acceptable level of FAR (∼ 20%). It is worthy to note that, given the different
goals of RF-mix and RF-attack classifiers, the definitions of FRR and FAR are also
different. For RF-attack and the two-layer classifiers, the FRR indicates the amount
of the genuine samples (not including attack samples) are falsely recognized as the
attack, and in contrast, the FAR represents the amount of the attack samples are
falsely accepted by the system.
According to Table 5.1, it is shown that only 1.75% of pure population attack
samples are accepted to update users’ templates in the keystroke authentication
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system. Similar results can be seen for user-specific attacks. When facing the more
challenging mixed data including both the genuine and attack samples, unsurprisingly,
a significant amount of mixed samples are falsely accepted. The higher the percentage
of the genuine samples in the mixed dataset is, the more difficult it is to identify the
attack samples. As the mix ratio increases from 1:2 to 1:1 and then to 2:1, the FAR
correspondingly increases from 49.55% to 62.39% and then 70.86% for the keystroke
system and from 29.87% to 34.67%. Based on this observation, it is clear that the
RF-attack classifier itself can effectively distinguish the genuine and attack samples,
which however, is less capable when a more challenging mixed dataset is presented.
This also proves the necessity of applying another separate filtering mechanism — the
RF-mix classifier in our approach.
Combining the aforementioned RF-mix and RF-attack classifiers, the proposed two-layer defense technique shows a very impressive performance in detecting
frog-boiling attack samples while retaining the genuine samples. In the keystroke
authentication system, FRR is 8.53%, and FAR is 1.37% (population attack) or
0.98% (user-specific attack) when facing the pure attack samples. When the input
data is mixed with both genuine and attack samples, the proposed two-layer defense
mechanism can still effectively detect and recognize the attack samples most of the
time. As explained in Section 4.4, the mixed data with the ratio of genuine samples
to attacks which is higher than 1:1 will significantly decrease the frog-boiling effect to
the system. That means, if the mixed data is dominated by the genuine samples, it is
less likely for the attacker to drift and influence the template updating results of the
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target authentication system. Consequently, the FARs at ratio 1:1 and 1:2 are still
acceptable for a qualified defensive system.

5.4 Performance Evaluation of Biometric Authentication System Against
frog-boiling Attacks
We have demonstrated that our proposed residual distribution based, two-layer
defense mechanism can effectively detect and block fake updates to the authentication
system, as shown in Section 5.3.2. In this section, we will further evaluate how this
mechanism protect and affect the performance of the keystroke authentication systems
under frog-boiling attacks.
5.4.1 Experimental Settings
We use a similar experimental setting as in Section 4.3, except that the
two authentication systems are equipped with the proposed residual-based defensive
mechanism to authenticate the input template updates as well. As described in Section
5.4.2, the systems make an updating decision for every 20 legit incoming samples,
and we use the sliding window updating mechanism. We evaluate the two systems
with both user-specific attacks and population attacks. For the user-specific attacks,
destination templates are generated from Attacker #1 in both biometric systems, the
most effective attackers in both cases.
5.4.2 Performance Evaluation on Keystroke Verification System
Table 5.2 summarizes the EER performance of the keystroke verification system
with the proposed defense mechanism under the frog-boiling attack. Comparing against
the baseline performance (see Table 4.1), the EERs stay almost the same, or even
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Table 5.2: EER performance (in percentage) of keystroke verification system with the
proposed defense mechanism under the frog-boiling attack.

Pure attack
Mixed 1:2
Mixed 1:1
Mixed 2:1

Attacker #1
SM
R
Fusion
15.33 19.79 10.91
14.65 18.63
9.87
13.78 18.14
9.69
13.57 17.55
9.67

Population Attack
SM
R
Fusion
14.21 19.88
9.89
13.32 17.50
9.66
13.11 17.42
9.65
12.96 17.48
9.66

lower than the baseline. For example, the SM verifier has an average EER percentage
of 13.29 at baseline, and 12.96%, 13.11%, and 13.32% under the population attack
with genuine/imposter attempt proportion of 2:1, 1:1, and 1:2, respectively. The
results show that the enhanced keystroke verification system becomes very resistant
to the frog-boiling attack and the template updating mechanism can work properly
even in the presence of fake samples.
Figure 5.3 shows the menagerie transition when the keystroke system with
residual-based detector is under the frog-boiling attack, and the type of attack is
mixed attack with a rate of 1:2. All the movements of the crosses are insignificant and
neglectable, and no animal transition can be observed. This indicates that the frogboiling attack has limited impacts to transfer good performed users to bad performed
users. Similar results are observed for the menagerie transition with pure attack, which
are thus not presented here due to the space limit.
Figure 5.4 shows the FRR and FAR performance of the keystroke verification
system with the proposed residual-based defensive mechanism, under the frog-boiling
attack (i.e., mixed attack with a rate of 1:2). It is observed that the changes to
the error rates are very small, and the most remarkable change seen for the SM
verifier only increases the FRR from around 0.13 to around 0.16. Some other verifiers
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Figure 5.3: Menagerie transitions due to the frog-boiling attack launched with Attacker
#1’s (User #47’s) template as the destination template, with mixed attack rate of 1:2.
The residual-based detector is used in the system.
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Figure 5.4: The changes of FAR and FRR over time during frog-boiling attack (e.g.,
mixed attack with a rate of 1:2) to the keystroke verification system with the proposed
residual-based detector.
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even see a decrement in error rates. For example, the FRR and FAR of the fusion
verifier decrease from 0.1 to around 0.09. Results in Table 5.2, Figure 5.3 and 5.4 all
provide evidences that our residual-based defensive mechanism successfully prevents
the intrusion from the frog-boiling attack.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation we analyzed the template evolution in keystroke dynamics,
investigated an adversarial template drift (i.e. the Frog-boiling attack) and analyzed
the trade-off between defending adversarial template drift and ability to update user
templates. Our results of template evolution analysis shows that although KIT features
have higher difference than KHT features, KHT features seeing more significant change,
and the evolution of keystroke templates strongly degrades the EER performance.
While our analysis of template evolution provides solid evidence that template updating
mechanism is needed, the study of the Frog-boiling attack reveals the risk of adversarial
template drift, showing how the attack changes well-performed users to ill-performed
users. After adding defensive design in the system (i.e. two-threshold updating)
with various scenarios, our analysis gives strong evidence that a system with better
effectiveness to update user template has larger vulnerability to adversarial template
drift, and shows that the impact of the Frog-boiling attack can be limited while the
updating threshold reaches a certain point. We have also introduced a novel detection
mechanism that exploits correlation between samples to find spurious update samples.
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We posit that the attacks and the detection mechanism can be extended to any
learning mechanism and thus require serious consideration by the community.

6.2 Future Work
6.2.1 Applications on Other Biometric Modalities
With evidences of biometric aging effect in other biometric modalities in
previous studies [27, 28, 29, 15, 47], we believe the applications of our attack and
defense mechanism is not limited to keystroke dynamics, and we will extend our work
to other modalities in the future. As described in Section 4.1, one of the advantage of
our attack mechanism is that it requires minimum knowledge from the attacker. We
will keep the same approach when we extend our mechanisms with minor tuning for
various biometric systems. As an example of our future work, we sampled an ERP
brainwave dataset [53] with some brief results. Some recent studies on brainwave
biometric [62] showed the impact of aging effect in EEG data, which indicated that
an adaptive system for brainwave authentication is needed.
We tested the Frog-Boiling attack in an ERP brainwave identification system
based on cross-correlation [53, 54], with a similar attack design as our keystroke
system (see Section 4.1). Figure 6.1 shows the error rate changes of the brainwave
identification system due to the influence of the frog-boiling attack. With the pure
attack, (the blue lines in both figure), we can see significant increments for both FRR
and FAR, from close to 0 to over 90%. With the mixed attack, FRR is increased from
around 6% to around 20%, and a slight increment in FAR. An interesting observation
from Figure 6.1 is that the increment of FAR with the pure attack starts at around
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Figure 6.1: The changes of FRR and FAR over time during frog-boiling attack to the
brainwave identification system. Attacks are generated with attacker #1.
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500th iteration of the frog-boiling attack, this is because after 500 iterations, the attack
sample transfers to the attacker’s template (the destination template, see Section 4.1
for details about how the attack samples transfer to the attacker’s template), and
FAR is calculated based on the attacker’s brainwave samples. This attack’s results
indicates the effectiveness of Frog-Boiling attack with ERP brainwave biometric. Next
we analyzed the correlation and residual distribution for ERP samples.
In Figure 6.2, the correlation, the first order and the second-order residual were
calculated with the same method described in Section 5.1. Comparing to the results
for keystroke in Figure 5.1, similar distinguishable differences among the genuine
samples (in blue), the pure attack samples (in red) and the mixed attack samples (in
green), can be observed on ERP brainwaves as well. It is shown that the residual
distribution of the genuine samples has a smoother transition over a relative larger
interval, unlike the sharp transition seen for the attack samples, which indicates the
manipulating nature of the attack samples. Figure 6.1 and 6.2 gave us some insights
of how our attack and defense mechanisms may work in other biometric modalities
and we will perform more throughout tests and analysis in the future.
6.2.2 Potentials of Our Works in Real Life
The goal of studying attacks and defenses in biometrics is to build a more
secure, stable, and efficient biometric identification or authentication system. With
the growing popularity of various biometric systems [55] in recent years, our works
could be extended furthermore in many real-life scenarios. The followings are some
examples to apply our works.
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Figure 6.2: Correlation and residual distribution for ERP brainwaves samples
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Mobile technologies: Mobile devices (i.e. smartphones, tablets) play a more
and more important role in our life, and the security issue raises with the stored
personal data. Many modern mobile devices have build-in biometric authentication
systems with automatic updates, using fingerprints and face sensor(see [1, 2]), to
replace the traditional PIN lock. Some other works built continuous verification with
touch sensors and accelerometer on smartphones [56, 57]. These systems are proved to
be effective, but they still have space to improve (see a recent reported flaw [58]). Our
proposed attack and defense could help enhance these mobile devices by improving
their updating procedure and intrusion detection systems.
Car technologies: the technique of self-driving vehicle is a research trend in
recent years [59]. One of the greatest challenges for automated cars is the vast variety
of vehicle environment and decision making [60], as many noise and outliers in realworld scenarios greatly impact the system. The residual-based mechanism has great
potential to filter noise and outliers as many of them are not implications of natural
behavior. Our defense procedure could improve the robustness of an automated car.
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